Diary of a Sociology Student: What is Social Theory and What is its Function?

This is an essay I wrote for a postgraduate course I took under Prof. Bryan Turner, called ‘Social Theory and Social Reality’. The first version of it got stolen along with my laptop in November 2006. I hastily reconstructed it from memory in order to meet the deadline, which was about 48 hours later. Prof. Turner writes with a crisp, direct, no-nonsense style, and encourages his students to do the same.

What is social theory and what is its function?

This is a difficult question to answer, due in part to the rapid development of social theories and the multiple approaches to social theorizing that are now considered acceptable practice in the social sciences. (Also, I wrote a much more complete essay, but my laptop got stolen and this less-nuanced version is a quick reconstruction of the main arguments from the initial version. Thus, at certain points I realize I am too abrupt or even polemic in my statements.) This essay is divided into two parts. In the first, I define ‘social’ and then ‘theory’, before putting forward a suggestion of what ‘social theory’ entails. In the second part of the essay, I suggest that social theory functions to provide guidance in social scientific research in three specific ways.

What is ‘social’?
Turner (1996) argues that there were stronger notions of what the ‘social’ comprised in the ideas of classical theorists, which are now being eroded. I will review ideas from this period before looking at contemporary notions of ‘the social’.

Holton (1996) suggests that ‘the social’ was often contrasted with ‘nature’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the ‘classical’ period of social theory. Thinkers of this period were concerned with the impact of social, economic and political processes on human living, and noted that relationships between people were becoming more complex and differentiated.

Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) for example, distinguished between groups that lived together as members of a ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft), ordering their collective living through common values and shared beliefs, and groups that lived together by impersonal ‘association’ (Gesellschaft), independently pursuing their own instrumental goals while ordering their collective living through official laws and regulations (Tonnies, 1957).

Depersonalization (or alienation for Marx, or anomie for Durkheim) was an outcome of changes in society that affected the relations between people. This was clearly experienced at an individual level, but was also a collective phenomenon. How did individual experience relate to collective experience? To what extent is human action independent and decided upon by free will? To what extent is it ‘determined’ or influenced by external forces? How does this interaction occur? These were questions that led to formulations of what the ‘social’ comprised, ‘the social’ distinguished primarily from ‘biology’ and ‘psychology’.

In the Rules of Sociological Method (1938) Durkheim argued that the ‘social’ “consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him (sic)”. He distinguished these ‘representations and actions’ from ‘organic phenomena’ more properly examined through biology, and ‘psychical phenomena’, which has no independent existence from individual consciousness, more appropriately examined through psychology.

He emphasized the coercive aspect of the ‘social’. Attempts to disregard or to struggle against these forces, norms, regularities and ideas invoke responses (or sanctions) that pressure individuals back into conformity. He also emphasizes a second characteristic: that “it exists independently of the particular forms that it may assume in the process of spreading itself within the group”. By this he emphasizes the separate existence of ‘the social’ from its manifestations – even if its effects are not clearly discernable, we should not presume that ‘the social’ does not exist.

Talcott Parsons took a structural-functionalist view of the ‘social’. He argued that it was an action subsystem separate from but integrated with three other action subsystems – ‘culture’, ‘personality’ and ‘behaviour organisms’. Each of these has different primary functions – respectively, integration, pattern-maintenance, goal-attainment, and adaptation. The ‘social’ sub-system for Parsons is organized “with primary reference to the articulation of social relationships”, in contrast, for example, to cultural systems which are “organized around the characteristics of complexes of symbolic meanings” (Parsons, 1993:322).

He emphasized it was through interpenetration than interchange between these subsystems occurred. He argued that there were four components to the social system which interpenetrated with the other sub-action systems, namely, values (the primary function of which was pattern-maintenance in relation to the ‘culture’ subsystems), norms (the primary function of which was integration) as well as collectivities and roles (which both function for goal-attainment and adaptation respectively in relation to personality).

He later clarifies:

“Reduced to the simplest terms, then, a social system consists in a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the “optimization of gratification” and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols” (1951:6-7).

Parsons and Durkheim are amongst those who attempt to define clearly the boundaries of what constitute ‘the social’ (for Marx’s and Weber’s ideas concerning ‘the social’, see Holton, 1996). Such strong notions concerning the ‘social’, which were conceptualized in relation to the rise of modern society and the focus on relations of production, have now been rethought as attention has shifted to the ‘postmodern’ condition, and in particular, to the rise of consumerism and the emphasis on ‘culture’.

Connor (1996), who reviews how cultural forms were studied and explained in terms of their wider significance in social life, argues that “the cultural and the social now cross and intersect in subtle and unpredictable ways” (p.363). ‘The social’ is no longer an autonomous realm, separate from ‘the cultural’.

It is not just the proliferation of cultural signs, symbols, and artifacts that distracts attention from (classical) ‘social’ phenomena. Theorists too, are reconceptualising what ‘the social’ means. Jameson (1991) notes that modern notions of ‘the real’ as existing separate from ‘culture’ are being challenged, such that theorists themselves no longer hold that such distinction exists. The emphasis on plurality, multiplicity and fragmentation come with a distrust of modern notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’. For those who hold that reality is a series of appearances (or representations) and that all truths are constructed, the claim that ‘the social’ exists autonomously is itself problematic. This implosion of meaning leads Baudrillard (1983) to signal, ironically, ‘the end of the social’.

Another challenge to the conceptualization of ‘the social’ as an autonomous realm is the significance of interconnection and networks across time, space and the nation-state which shape social relations in ways not anticipated by classical theorists (Urry, 1996). As Nikolas Rose (1996) notes, with the ‘rise of the language of globalization, social relations cannot be understood as organized across a single bounded territory’ (p. 327–8).

There is still much contemporary debate concerning what constitutes ‘the social’ and how it may be reconceptualised. What is apparent, for the moment, is that ‘the social’ will continue to change in meaning. ‘The social’ is in itself a theoretical construct.

What is ‘theory’?
Theory for the social sciences draws upon two traditions – the natural sciences and philosophy.

Alexander suggests that “theory is a generalization separated from particulars, an abstraction separated from a concrete case” (1987:2). Werkmeister, looking first from the perspective of the natural sciences, suggests that “(a) theory, reduced to its bare essentials, consists of a set of definitions and postulates from which certain theorems or laws descriptive of observed facts can be logically derived” (1959:487).

For Werkmeister, theory construction is essential “for it is theory that leads to comprehension, and it is theory that provides an explanation of experimental findings and that inspires new experiments” (p.487). However, the task of a social scientist, he points out, is different to that of a natural scientist. Theory for the social sciences has to incorporate considerations of humans as conscious and deliberate actors, and to include a sound interpretation of context. As theorists themselves are social actors, they also need to be aware of their own “basic valuations” (p.503) and to state these explicitly so that these can be identified and evaluated.

In theory construction, concept formation is an integral process. For Werkmeister, this involves both the clear and concise definition of concepts as well as the interrelation of concepts such that they “form a systematic whole” (p.494).

Different types of theories operate at different levels, depending on the phenomena studied and the extent of the claims made. Thus, there are meta-theories, analytical schemes and formal propositions, ‘middle-range’ theories, and empirical generalizations and observations (Turner, 1996).

With this in mind, I suggest that there are five characteristics that are important about theory in relation to the social sciences.

Firstly, theory is a possible generalization or explanation. That is, it is not a truth, even though it may be taken as such. Otherwise it would be an ideology and not a theory.

Secondly, theory is a product of conscious effort. While there are generalizations about the world that we use unconsciously to guide our own behaviours, theory for the purposes of social research is a conscious effort involving reflection, reading, testing assumptions, analyzing data and making comparisons to previous and contemporary ideas. Theory goes beyond common-sense understandings; indeed, an important aspect of theory (as stated by Durkheim, 1938, amongst others) is that it challenges and examines common-sense notions.

Thirdly, there is a ‘social’ aspect to the development of theory. That is, theory is constructed not for personal application alone, but is put forward to an audience for discussion, evaluation, and analysis. Thus, there is a social process through which theories are developed. It is rare to find a theory put forward that is not later improved or refined either by the original thinker or by others. In some cases, theorists may completely revise their theories. For example, we see diachronic inconsistencies in the ideas of theorists such as Marx, Foucault and Parsons.

Fourthly, theories help other thinkers to work through problems that they grapple with; there is a sense of movement and engagement in the development of theory. This aspect is reflected, in part, by writers who write reviews of contemporary theory. When Turner (1996) points out that it is difficult to clearly identify ‘progress’ in social theory, he refers to the building up of explanations on particular topics that arise as theorists put forward generalizations that add to other generalizations. However, this project is made difficult when, as Turner states, there is no common agreement of what constitutes theory and or what it can achieve (p.11).

It is this aspect of ‘achievement’ that relates to my last observation about theory (which perhaps should have been my first) – there are differences of opinion about what theory should achieve. Hempel (1959), amongst others, suggests that theory should go beyond description to explanation and understanding. He reviews different methods of explanation, which include deductive and inductive nomological explanation (accounting for phenomena though identifying verifiable laws), and functional analysis (explanations by reference to ends rather than causes). Werkmeister (1959) too, emphasizes the difference between description and explanation. In contrast to the former, which is “a simple enumerative account of the observable features or qualities of individual things, acts, or events”, the latter is “an attempt to account for the facts, to show why they are what they are” (my emphasis, p.484).

However, explanation of what and for what? The classical theorists were specifically concerned with problems that they saw were outcomes of modern industrial society (Outhwaite, 2000). As Holton (1996) points out, there was a moral and political aspect of their intellectual engagement; they were personally committed to social reform or revolution in order to address causes of oppression. They were also critical of ideas arising from economics and psychology that purported to provide an understanding of modern society, and which legitimized particular exercises of power. In a similar vein, C. Wright Mills (1959) argued that theories should address problems in the world; if they were too general or abstract they would not provide any real value.

However, in the present, particularly with the ‘literary turn’ and the ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences, the focus of theory has changed. Theory no longer has to explicitly address a ‘problem’ in society – theory can be a ‘reading’ or an interpretation of phenomena without intended prescription. It can also be developed on secondary accounts, or on texts, rather than on first-hand empirical research. Even when theory is a critical engagement, theorists may not be concerned with providing specific solutions or directions for action; criticism thus becomes an end in itself. Rojek and Turner (2000) consider these ‘decorative sociology’.

In summary, Turner notes that

“(t)here is very little agreement as to what “theory” is or what would constitute theoretical progress. As a result, theory may be regarded as a broad framework for organizing and ordering research, or as a collection of general concepts which are useful in directing research attention, or as a specific orientation which leads the researcher to well-known problems and issues” (Turner, 1996:11).

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this essay and with the considerations already outlined, I suggest that a social theory is a possible generalization – which may be an explanation, evaluation or interpretation – of the relationships, practices, institutions, norms, values, and regularities that impact on people in collective living.

The function of social theory: To provide guidance
In this last part of the essay, and drawing upon Turner’s (1996:11) reflection, I argue that theory functions to provide guidance in social research in three specific ways.

Firstly, social theory guides the formulation of questions by providing assumptions.

Alexander (1987) discusses this issue at length. He points out that when a generalization (or a theoretical claim) is made, it is based on a combination of assumptions that are informed by other theories. He calls these the ‘non-empirical elements’ of a generalization which range from political ideas, to models of how society is structured (whether as a functioning system or as an assemblage of institutions), to ideas of which methodological perspectives are most valid, to ideas about whether the world exists in equilibrium or in conflict. He also argues that researchers cannot escape from two more fundamental ‘presuppositions’ about reality – firstly, the nature of action (whether they are rational or non-rational) and secondly, how order in society is produced (whether collectively prior to individual action, or individualistically, through individual negotiation with social regularities) (*1).

Feminism as an example, concerns the experiences of women in relation to men. Catherine MacKinnon (1989) provides one definition of feminism (of which there are many), suggesting that “(a) theory is feminist to the extent it is persuaded that women have been unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of their bodies” (p.35). This assumes, firstly, that gender is socially significant, secondly, that gender is embodied, and thirdly, that women are unjustly treated in comparison to men. These assumptions are brought into feminist theory and implicate research by shaping the vision researchers bring to their analysis. These assumptions are different for example, from those of gender studies and the study of masculinities.

Secondly, social theory guides the methodological perspective of researchers, and thus informs the use of methods and what constitutes evidence.

I contrast empiricist and phenomenological approaches to illustrate this point. Empiricists hold the view that meaningful knowledge about the world is based on sensory experience and observation. Thus, they do not take the thoughts, ideas and feelings of others as valid evidence. The research methods they employ focus on accumulating and codifying observable data, usually through pre-defined, structured experiments. For logical empiricists, conclusions are made through logical analysis of data, and are only valid if they can be verified by others. This is why they make their methods of data collection and analysis transparent.

Phenomenological approaches, on the other hand, focus on consciousness. Those who follow Husserl’s ideas hold that thought is intentional and constructed inter-subjectively. To understand to the social world, one should not try to examine objects in the world ‘as they are’, but focus on the experience of phenomena by people. Alfred Schutz suggested that it was possible to study how people make sense of the world by examining the ‘types’ by which they evaluated themselves and based their own action according to their systems of relevance (Wilson, 2002). As emphasis is placed on understanding the experiences of people, phenomenological research methods focus on drawing out narrative accounts, e.g. through interviews or diaries. The mode of analysis of this data depends on the specific theoretical perspective of the researcher, but focuses on drawing themes from the data rather than imposing a priori conceptual categories.

Lastly, social theory guides us in thinking why we should bother doing research at all.

This comes back to the earlier discussion on what we want to achieve through social theory. As stated earlier, classical theorists were concerned with social problems and were involved in projects to effect social reform. I also noted earlier that this has changed with postmodernism, particularly with the literary and cultural turn in the social sciences. In responding to this, Turner and Rojek (2000) argue that sociology should not be ‘decorative’, but should “return to the social via a reformulation of action theory” (p.640). For them research should be “driven by an empirical research agenda, embrace an historical and comparative framework, and have a genuinely sociological focus, that is, a focus on the changing balance of power in Western capitalism” (p.629). In other words, research should not be driven by theoretical change alone. They argue that there must be a commitment to historical/comparative analysis, and there must be a political agenda (i.e. the research should be policy-relevant) rather than focus on political criticism for its own sake.

(*1) This relates to debates concerning the relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’.

References
Alexander, J.C. (1987) Twenty Lectures: Sociological Theory Since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press.

Baudrillard, J. (1983) In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, New York: Semiotext(e).

Connor, S. (1996) Cultural Sociology and Cultural Sciences, in Turner, B.S. (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 340-368.

Durkheim, E. (1938) The Rules of Sociological Method, Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press.

Hempel, C.G. (1959) The Logic of Functional Analysis, in Gross, L. (ed) Symposium on Sociological Theory, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, pp. 271-310.

Holton, R.J. (1996) Classical Social Theory, in Turner, B.S. (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 25-52.

Jameson, F. (1991) Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, London: Verso.

MacKinnon, C. (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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Outhwaite (2000) Social Theory at the End of the Century, http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/009outhwaite.htm

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Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Rojek, C. and Turner, B. (2000) Decorative Sociology: Towards a Critique of the Cultural Turn, The Sociological Review, 48(4): 629-648.

Rose, N. (1996) The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of Government, Economy and Society, 25(3): 327–56.

Tonnies, F. (1957) Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis, The Michigan State University Press.

Turner, B.S. (1996) Introduction, in Turner, B.S. (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-19.

Urry, J. (1996) Sociology of Time and Space, in Turner, B.S. (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 369-428.

Wilson, T.D. (2002) Alfred Schutz, Phenomenology and Research Methodology for Information Behaviour Research, A paper delivered at ISIC4 – Fourth International Conference on Information Seeking in Context, Universidade Lusiada, Lisbon, Portugal, September 11 to 13.

Werkmeister, W.H. (1959) Theory Construction and the Problem of Objectivity, in Gross, L. (ed) Symposium on Sociological Theory, Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, pp. 483-508.